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AFFORDABLE WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION
Institutional development, Brazil
Government department
Twenty years on, the poor quality and worsening serv-
ice gave the regional government an excuse to take the
concession from the Council. They decided to run the
service as a decentralised government department. The
staff of the water department were civil servants and the
department had no financial autonomy, its budget being
part of state budget. The Regional Government attached
the water department to the Health Secretary with the
intention for it to be self supporting through customer
tariffs.
There was an emphasis on constructing standposts for
the low-income householders and increasing the number
of household connections to provide a reliable service for
those who were paying.
Subsequently the water department was moved to the
Building Secretary in the early nineteen forties, showing
a change in perspective. It was then that the services
started to be seen as an economic good, that is as founda-
tion for industrialization and economic growth.
Autonomous agency
In the early sixties, a new economic development cycle
was growing, following the CEPAL (Executive Commis-
sion for Latin America) model of import substitution
process promoted in many Latin America countries. The
new model demanded an urgent provision of public
services in urban areas as infrastructure was necessary to
start up the plan. The acceleration of the urbanization
process which occurred in that period reflected the new
capital accumulation pattern where a massive invest-
ment in urban infrastructure was part of the strategy for
encouraging productive activities.
The urban water supply and sanitation sector had not
only to provide basic conditions of living for the labour
force but also allow the expansion of many other indus-
tries related to the service, particularly construction.
Using the CEPAL model, international organizations
like The World Bank and The Inter-American Bank gave
loans as part of an agenda where the social problems were
addressed and prioritised  (Cardoso, 1982). The terms of
the Inter-American Bank loan, meant a change in the
national approach to urban Watsan. The bank demanded
dynamic organizations, independent from political inter-
ference and pressures to ensure that the money would be
used according to the initial stated purpose.
In addition, it was essential for the Bank to achieve a
return on the investment. Tariffs were required to cover
TO ENSURE THE safe provision of water and sanitation it is
necessary to have effective and efficient institutions. This
paper investigates the institutional changes in the urban
water supply and sanitation sector in Latin American
countries as different generations have sought to find the
best approach.
The study focusses on  Salvador in Brazil, covering the
period 1853-1990. It is thought that with some differences
due to local peculiarities, the pattern in other Latin America
countries has followed a similar process.
Institutional changes in urban Watsan
in Salvador, Brazil
The urban water and sanitation services in Brazil have
been subjected to major institutional changes since the
middle of the nineteenth century when the large cities
first acquired a public water supply for the improvement
of public health.
Private concessions
At the beginning, the service was run by private compa-
nies, mainly British or Portuguese. In Salvador, Bahia, the
service was run by a Portuguese private company that
had a concession from the council.  Initially the company
did not have a monopoly and the majority of the popula-
tion continued using water sold by water vendors from
fountains. The concessionaire therefore managed to per-
suade the Council to grant them a monopoly.
The concession contract was similar to the ones already
being used in France whereby the private company in-
vests in plant and equipment and a distribution network
and charges the customers directly. The tariff was nego-
tiated with the Council rather than being set directly by
the company.
The contract with that first company lasted 50 years but
was not renewed as the service by then was not consid-
ered satisfactory and the company and the Council could
not agree about the setting of tariffs. The Council there-
fore bought the assets of the ‘Companhia do Queimado’
and by putting the service out to tender a contract was
agreed and signed. The investment for upgrading the
system was financed by the council through a loan from
‘Banque L’Union Banque Parisienne’. There was a change
therefore from what we would now term a ‘Build, Oper-
ate and Own’ (BOO) concession to a management con-
tract where the concessionaire is not responsible for capi-
tal improvements.
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investment costs as well as operation and maintenance.
The institutional framework set up as a result of those
conditions comprised organisations officially attached to
the regional government but quite autonomous.
In Salvador, Brazil, the regional government stated that
the water supply service would be managed as an indus-
try, as concerned about revenues and profit as any other
industry (Magalhaes, 1961). The physical network  was
mainly directed to the areas with greatest potential for
revenue generation. The financing model  played a key
role in the mode of management. This official proposal,
presenting the service as an economic good, represented
a significant change from a political leadership who usu-
ally promised services to the poor knowing that they
could not deliver.
Centralised control
From the 1970’s, to the 1990’s, the pattern of urban Watsan
was established by the military central government as a
consequence of the centralised managerial model prac-
tised during that time for public policies.
This model was market based (as opposed to welfare
oriented) as described by Melo (1989), and Coing et al
(1989). Coing explains how it aimed to have a self-financ-
ing and profitable Watsan sector. The policy was based on
regional state companies using a tariff system based on
financial transfers from high-income to low-income house-
holders. The industrial management of the sector re-
mained an important idea.
Discussion
So far the alternative institutional approaches have been
seen to be the consequence of external influences or the
consequence of failure in the sector. Nevertheless, it is
important to analyse the constant dilemma faced by the
authorities in low-income countries, where the compa-
nies face an endless deficit spiral.
Coing et al (1988) say that the management mode is a
result of change in social relations amongst the users as
well as in the use of water. In the case studied in this
paper, and in many other Latin American countries, the
dilemma faced by the public authorities is to balance the
contradictions between the different demands from high-
income and low-income householders in the same geo-
graphical area, a problem that has been constant through-
out the 20th century.
Despite the constant official line that the changes would
provide efficacy and sustainability, political considera-
tions have never allowed organisations to charge the real
cost of water to the customers. Even in the two last
changes in the 1960’s and 1970’s,  dictated by important
external actors (Inter American Bank and the Central
Government), the authorities did not succeed in charging
the real costs. The vast majority of public water compa-
nies in Brazil and more than half in Latin America are run
with large deficits.
The political aspects of setting a tariff according to the
real cost is immense in an environment where the poor do
not have access to many of their basic needs, and there are
large inequalities in society. The price of water is part of
the welfare role played by the public authorities. At the
same time they play the game set by the technocrats,
opting for global technical solutions but not taking into
consideration the subsequent feasibility for customers
who are unable to pay  properly for the service. “Poor
households cannot afford the design standard of indus-
trial countries, but such standards are not necessary on
health grounds” (World Bank, 1993:46).
In practice, there is a lack of political will among the
authorities, making it difficult to charge the population. It
is then said that there is no willingness to pay which
encourages the utilization of a large number of subsidies
that, in fact, will only provide cheap services, sometimes
at a high standard, for the rich minority of the population.
Jacobi (1989) studied the difficulties faced by low-
income householders in poor areas of Sao Paulo, Brazil in
obtaining water connections. Carteado (1993) quantified
the number of complaints by customers lacking water in
high-income and low-income areas of  Salavador, Brazil
during the period 1976-1986 which demonstrated dis-
crimination in water delivery.
The changing policy role played  by the public authori-
ties causes the management of the sector to progress in a
pendular fashion. Sometimes, the leading conception is
that the provision of services is more closely related to
economic growth; at other times, it is believed that the
service is a right for every citizen, as water is basic for
survival. However, even when one of the views is lead-
ing, the other still has a  role.
This is the dilemma faced by the authorities. When the
efficacy thesis for economic development predominates,
the institutional approach is defined by self-sustainability
and an entrepreneurial managerial. It is said that the
service ought to be run as any other industry. Measures
should be taken in order to make the activity attractive to
the private sector, the market demand is prioritized, the
tariffs tend to be set taking into consideration not only the
operational and maintenance costs, but also the cost of
investment. The project engineering during those periods
is tempted to emulate industrialised country solutions,
prioritizing the water production and transmission, rather
than the distribution network.
When the opposite view is predominant, in which the
provision of water is seen as a basic right for every citizen
not related to his/her income, government actions lead to
extending the physical network towards the peripheral
areas. The technological approach then, where possible,
produces local and cheaper solutions. There is also a
closeness between the activity and public health activi-
ties. Within this perspective, the tariff must be related to
the presumed ‘ability to pay’ of the customer, not directly
to the cost or quality of service.
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Figure 1. Institutional models for urban Watsan
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But even then Coing (1992) explains that the possibility
of exploiting Watsan services did not work properly
because countries did not have the capacity to provide a
consumption market that allowed the largest part of the
population to become part of the market. Thus, a large
part of the population has no access to the service, making
it difficult for the country to reinvest within the Watsan
sector. In Salvador, even after a large investment in a
sewerage system during the 1970’s only 18 per cent of the
population had proper sanitation services in 1990
(Carteado, 1993).
The future
Whilst the pendulum of institutional change keeps swing-
ing it remains a fact that the poorest do not receive from
the public service the water they need for basic needs
health. Similarly industry often does not receive the water
it needs for economic growth. The poorest end up pur-
chasing water from vendors at many times the cost per
cubic metre that they would pay through the official
system (in some cases over one hundred times as much)
and industry ends up paying more by contructing its own
facilities to ensure a reliable supply, but thereby forfeiting
the desired economies of scale. It can be argued that the
main beneficiaries of the present system are the high and
middle-income domestic consumers with household con-
nections and household storage tanks.
Alternative means of managing watsan services are
now being considered again with the emphasis on private
sector involvement. An example of the ‘wheel coming full
circle’ again for Bahia? The main options appear to be
either a leasing contract or complete divestiture through
sale of the equity. Adapting Coyaud (1988),  the table lists
the options now seen as available for Watsan provision.
The table additionally makes the distinction between the
wholesale provider and the retail provider. Quite differ-
ent skills are required for bulk abstraction, treatment and
transmission of water (wholesaling) as opposed to distri-
bution, tariff collection and consumer service (retailing).
UNICEF (1992) have been involved in an example of  a
retailer approach in Tegucigalpa, Honduras where 45,000
people in 25 low-income neighbourhoods have received
water at less cost than they used to pay to vendors
through sale of water from the public network to commu-
nity tanks.
In considering all the options and choices available to
ensure a viable institutional framework for watsan serv-
ices for the whole range of consumers to achieve public
health and economic growth it is now necessary to accept
that there will be a network of ‘actors’, involved in both
providing and purchasing.
No decisions have yet been taken as to which is the most
suitable combination of ‘actors’ for Bahia. The conclusion
is that although the institutional framework plays a key
role in the style of managing, the most important idea that
will allow countries to overcome the constant deficit crisis
in urban Watsan in Latin America will be the political
willingness to make the sector feasible not only in speeches
but more importantly in practice.
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